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This study evaluated the potential to supply biomass feedstocks under alternative contract 
arrangements for a northwest Tennessee 2,400 acre grain farm. The four potential types 
of contracts analyzed in this study offer different levels of biomass price, yield, and 
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Farmers, agribusiness, policymakers, and others have shown considerable interest in the 
potential for on-farm production of biomass for ethanol production (English et al, 2006). The 
potential volume of ethanol produced from cellulosic sources such as wheat straw, corn stover, 
and switchgrass is much greater than the potential volume of ethanol from corn grain (Epplin 
etal., 2007). Perlack et al. (2005) estimates that more than a billion tons of cellulosic feedstock 
could be produced annually in the United States. Compared to other agricultural commodities, 
transportation costs from grower to processor for cellulosic feedstocks will be relatively high, 
due to their bulkiness and low energy densities. This transportation cost factor will likely result 
in a more locally-grown market situation for biomass feedstock. Thus, the development of 
biobased industries, at least initially, will hinge on the local availability of sufficient, cost 
competitive biomass feedstocks. 
Given the high cost of constructing a production facility, the processor likely will have an 
interest in providing contracts or other incentives to induce farmers to supply sufficient 
feedstocks to keep the plant operating at capacity. One possible alternative for supplying biomass 
to the processor is a vertically integrated system where the plant leases (or purchases) 
agricultural lands and directly manages the production, harvest, storage, and transportation of 
feedstocks (Epplin et al. 2007). Another alternative for the processing plant is to enter into long-
term production and harvest contracts with individual farmers (Epplin et al., 2007). There may 
also be opportunities for farmer cooperative-based vertical ownership of the bioenergy 







1 risk and return of several potential biomass contract structures that could be used long-term 
production and harvest contracts with individual farmers.  
A number of factors may influence farmers’ willingness to supply biomass feedstocks 
such as corn stover, wheat straw, and/or switchgrass to a local processing facility. For example, 
how do biomass crops such as switchgrass compare to traditional crops with respect to costs of 
production, yields, price potential in terms of its energy equivalent to gasoline or coal, net 
returns, and risk (variability of net revenues) under different management practices, weather 
conditions, energy market conditions, government policies, and contract pricing arrangements 
provided by the processing plant? Supplying biomass feedstocks will require changes in the way 
farmers manage their operations. 
The ability of farmers to respond to a potential market for biomass feedstocks will be 
constrained by on-farm economic, structural, and resource constraints (e.g., time constraints, 
equipment constraints, land ownership, debt structure, farm size, production activities (i.e., crop, 
livestock), soil type and topography, farm program participation, etc.). For example, who would 
pay for investment in perennial crop establishment, harvest equipment, and storage for the 
biomass? Would the farm have enough labor resources to grow and harvest the crop? Farmers 
who must bear all of the feedstock price, production risks, and financial risks may not be willing 
to supply biomass or be willing to supply limited amounts of biomass at all to a processing 
facility. The willingness of farmers to provide biomass feedstocks will be a function of biomass 
feedstock profits, variability of profits, and correlation of profits relative to traditional crop 
profits. These factors will vary with respect to the contractual incentives that may be offered by 
the processing facility. Thus, an understanding of the factors that will affect farmer decisions to 






2 Currently, research about the potential risks and risk management benefits of on-farm 
biomass production is lacking. In addition, analysis of the impacts of potential biomass contract 
structures on risk and return and farmer willingness to supply biomass is also limited. Larson et 
al. (2005) evaluated the risk management benefits of a marketing contract with a penalty for 
production underage or excess production is sold at the spot market price based on the energy 
equivalent value as a substitute for gasoline on farmer willingness to supply switchgrass, corn 
stover, or wheat straw. However, the Larson et al (2005) study did not evaluate other potential 
contract alternatives such as acreage contracts (Paulson and Babcock, 2007), gross revenue 
contracts (Garland, 2007), or other financial incentives that could be used to induce on-farm 
biomass production for a processor. Thus, the objective of this research is to evaluate the risk and 
return tradeoffs of producing biomass feedstocks under alternative contractual arrangements with 
a processing facility.  The analysis was conducted for representative grain farm located in 
northwest Tennessee. 
Methods and Data 
Representative Farm 
A farm-level model was developed to evaluate contract biomass feedstock production 
under risk for a northwest Tennessee 2,400 acre grain farm. The farm was assumed to produce 
corn, soybeans, and winter wheat. The representative farm also was assumed to have the 
opportunity to provide biomass feedstocks to a local single-user facility that produces ethanol. 
The farm was assumed to be able to produce three energy crop production alternatives: corn 
stover, wheat straw and switchgrass. Thus, the representative farm had the choice between 







3 produce wheat grain only or wheat grain and wheat straw for sale to individual, wholesalers, and 
retailers or wheat straw for ethanol production. 
Risk Programming Model 
A quadratic programming model incorporating farm labor and land quality constraints, 
biomass yield variability, crop and energy price variability, alternative contractual arrangements, 
and risk aversion was developed for the analysis. The objective function was to maximize the 
certainty equivalent value of whole farm net revenues for different levels of risk significance 
(McCarl and Bessler, 1989). Risk significance levels (α) of 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent were 
used to generate risk-efficient farm plans for different levels of absolute risk aversion. The risk 
levels model the certainty of obtaining or exceeding a maximized lower level confidence limit on 
net revenues (Dillon, 1999). Thus, for a risk neutral decision maker a 50% percent certainty that 
the actual net revenues will meet or exceed expected net revenues. For risk averse decision 
makers, a higher probability of certainty is required on net revenues; thus, a risk significance 
levels (α) of higher than 50% is required.  
The three resource constraints specified in the model were for soil type, labor, and 
available field days for wheat straw and corn stover harvest. Total land was restricted to 2,400 
acres and land for each soil type was restricted to 1,200 acres of Collins soils, 528 acres of 
Loring soils, and 672 acres of Memphis soils. Six bimonthly labor periods were specified in the 
model. Labor requirements by period were from crop budgets by Gerloff (2007a; 2007b). Labor 
availability by period was for a family of four (Johnson, 1991). In addition to family labor, it was 
assumed that the farm could hire an additional 2,000 hours of labor per year at $8.50/hour 
(Gerloff, 2007a). Hired labor was assumed to have an efficiency of 90% in the model to account 






4 number of suitable days available to harvest corn stover and wheat straw after grain harvest was 
constrained to 21-10 hour days. For the soybean-wheat double crop, the available days to harvest 
straw between the wheat grain harvest and the planting of the soybean crop was assumed to be 
10-10 hour days. 
Biomass Contracting Alternatives 
The potential biomass contracting alternatives modeled for the west Tennessee 
representative crop farm were: 1) a spot market contract (SPOT) where biomass is priced yearly 
on its current energy equivalent value as a substitute for gasoline at the processing plant gate, 2) 
a standard marketing contract (STANDARD) with a penalty for production underage or excess 
production is sold at the spot market price (Musser, Mapp, and Barry, 1984; Paulson and 
Babcock, 2007), 3) an acreage contract (ACREAGE) which provides a guaranteed annual price 
on the actual biomass produced in each year on the contracted biomass acreage (Paulson and 
Babcock, 2007), and 4) a gross revenue contract (REVENUE) which provides a guaranteed 
annual gross revenue per acre from biomass based on a guaranteed contract price times expected 
yield per acre over the life of the contract (Garland, 2007). 
The four potential types of contracts that could be used to encourage biomass production 
offer different levels of biomass price, yield, and production cost risk sharing between the 
representative farm and the processor. The SPOT contract assumes that all of the output price, 
yield, and production cost risk from biomass production is borne by the farmer. With the 
STANDARD contract, a portion of the price risk on expected production is shifted from the 
producer to the processor. All of the price risk is shifted from the farmer to the processor with an 
ACRAGE contract but the farmer still incurs all yield and production cost risk. On the other 






5 because all of the biomass price and yield risk is assumed by the processor. In addition, a 
contract provision for switchgrass that provides a financial incentive to reduce production cost 
risk by covering the materials cost of establishing the switch grass stand was also modeled. The 
gross revenue contract and the planting incentive are two potential switchgrass production 
incentives that are being consider for contract production for the cellulosic ethanol pilot plant 
being constructed for Tennessee Biofuels Initiative (Garland, 2007). The time period for each of 
the four types of contracts modeled was assumed to be 5 years (Garland, 2007).  
Simulation Analysis 
A 99 year distribution of net revenues for each the crop activity was simulated for use in 
the quadratic programming model to determine risk-efficient farm plans under the alternative 
contracting scenarios. The variables treated as random in the simulation of net revenues were 
crop prices, crop yields, nitrogen fertilizer price, diesel fuel price, and selected biomass harvest 
and transportation costs as a function of harvested yield. The ALMANAC crop model (Kiniry et 
al., 2005) was used to simulate random crop yields for the continuous crop and crop rotations on 
the Loring, Memphis, and Collins soils for the representative farm. A 99 year set of real, 
detrended, and correlated prices for corn, soybeans, wheat, wheat straw, corn stover, switch 
grass, nitrogen fertilizer, and diesel fuel were simulated using the @Risk simulation model in 
Decision Tools (Palisade Corporation, 2007). Energy equivalent price series for switchgrass, 
corn stover, and wheat straw as an ethanol based energy substitute for gasoline were constructed 
using wholesale gasoline price data for 1977 through 2004 (U.S. DOE, 2007) and biomass 
conversion to ethanol factors from Wang, Saricks, and Santini (1999). The number of gallons of 
ethanol assumed to be produced per dry ton (dt) of biomass was assumed to be 69.2 gallons for 






6 stover and wheat straw were adjusted downward by 5 percent and 9 percent, respectively, from 
the contract price for switchgrass to reflect the lower gallons per dt produced. 
Corn, soybean, wheat, and soybean-wheat production costs were derived from University 
of Tennessee Extension budgets (Gerloff, 2007a). All three biomass crops were assumed to be 
harvested using a large round bale system with the bales being moved to the edge of the field 
before transport to the user facility. Switchgrass production costs were estimated using a budget 
produced by University of Tennessee Extension (Gerloff, 2007b). 
Results and Discussion 
Base Scenario Risk Efficient Farm Plans Without Biomass Crops 
The profit-maximizing farm plan that does not consider biomass crop production 
alternatives is presented in Table 1. The profit maximizing farm plan in the absence of biomass 
crop alternatives produced 528 acres of continuous corn on the Loring soil and 1,200 acres of 
continuous corn on the Loring soil. A combination of 100 acres of continuous corn, 420 acres of 
wheat grain and straw, and 152 acres of soybean-wheat, double-crop grain and straw were 
produced on the Memphis soil. Because of its relative profitability, the farm produced the 
maximum amount of straw for sale to wholesalers/retailers given the constraint on available 
harvest time. Mean farm net revenue for the base profit maximizing farm plan was $472,175 
with a standard deviation of net revenues of $152,926. In general, mean crop net revenues were 
the largest on the Memphis soil and the smallest on the Collins soil. The coefficient of variation 
of crop net revenues, a measure of relative risk (variation) of net revenues, was generally higher 
(riskier) for crop enterprises on the poorer quality Collins soil and lower (less risky) on the 







7 Risk significance levels of 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent were used to generate risk-
efficient farm plans for different levels of absolute risk aversion. Parameterization of the 
programming model to include absolute risk aversion did not change the risk efficient crop mix 
from the base profit maximizing solution for the 50, 60, 70, and 80 percent risk significance 
levels. For these levels of risk significance, no other combination of crop enterprises on the three 
soil types provided a more favorable risk-return tradeoff. In these cases, the most profitable crop 
enterprise was also the least risky. For the 90 percent risk significance level the crop mix became 
more diversified on the Memphis and Loring soils. Crops produced on the Loring soil were 274 
acres of continuous corn, 134 acres of soybeans, 112 acres of continuous winter wheat grain and 
straw, and 152 acres of soybean-wheat, double-crop grain and straw. For the Loring soil, the 
optimal crop mix changed from all continuous corn to a combination of 913 acres of continuous 
corn and 287 acres of continuous wheat grain and straw. 
Risk Efficient Farm Plans With Biomass Crops 
The important findings under the biomass production scenario were as follows. First, 
under the SPOT scenario, biomass prices averaged $29.44/dt (standard deviation of $9.34/dt) for 
wheat straw, $29.44/dt (standard deviation of $15.50/dt) for corn stover, and $34.77/dt (standard 
deviation of $7.43/dt) for switchgrass. When biomass crops were priced annually based on the 
energy equivalent price, the production of biomass crops did not enter into the optimal crop mix 
for any risk significance level except the most risk averse 90 percent level (Table 2). For this 
level of risk aversion, only 36 acres on switchgrass was planted on the poorest quality Collins 
soil. No other biomass crops were planted on the rest of the farm. Thus, an average of only 324 
dt of biomass would be supplied by the representative farm under the SPOT contract scenario. In 






8 to induce biomass production  Results indicate that a contract price above the energy equivalent 
price would be needed to encourage biomass production on the representative farm. 
Second, the ACREAGE and REVENUE contracts were more effective at inducing 
maximum farm biomass production at lower contract prices than the STANDARD contract for a 
risk neutral decision maker (Figure 1). Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the same amount 
of biomass was supplied by the representative farm under the REVENUE contract as under the 
ACREAGE contract. Expected biomass crop net revenues were identical for both contract 
structures. Most of the biomass supplied by the representative farm under the STANDARD, 
ACREAGE, and REVENUE contracts was from switchgrass. In addition, some corn stover was 
produced but no wheat straw was supplied for ethanol production by the representative farm. 
Third, because the REVENUE contract reduced biomass crop net revenue variability 
relative to the ACREAGE contract, the REVENUE contract provided more risk benefits to the 
representative farm under the assumption of risk aversion (Figure 2). In addition, because of the 
greater price and yield protection offered with the REVENUE contract, swtichgrass production 
was generally induced at lower contract prices than with the STANDARD contract. Fourth, 
results of this study suggest that a planting incentive to offset part of the cost of establishing 
switchgrass may be effective at inducing biomass larger production at lower contract prices. The 
incentive may provide a method for the processor to reduce average per ton cost of material at 
the plant gate for perennial biomass crops such as switchgrass. 
Finally, as more of the farm crop area was planted into biomass crop at higher contract 
prices, the greater the annual variation in biomass supplied to the processing plant (Figure 3). 
Thus, for a processor, there may be a relationship between the annual variation in biomass 






9 production on an individual farm. This could result in fewer farms in a more concentrated 
geographic area being needed to supply the plant. The biomass materials transportation cost may 
be lower but the biomass storage cost incurred to ensure a steady supply of feedstock to the plant 
may be higher with the increased variability of annual biomass production with higher contract 
prices. 
Conclusions 
This study developed a farm-level model to evaluate the ability and willingness of 
farmers to provide biomass feedstocks for a northwest Tennessee 2,400 acre grain farm under 
alternative contract arrangements. A quadratic programming model incorporating farm labor and 
land quality constraints, biomass yield variability, crop and energy price variability, alternative 
contractual arrangements, and risk aversion was developed for the analysis. The four potential 
types of contracts analyzed in this study that could be used to encourage biomass production 
offer different levels of biomass price, yield, and production cost risk sharing between the 
representative farm and the processor. The spot market contract (SPOT) based on the yearly 
energy equivalent value with gasoline assumes that all of the output price, yield, and production 
cost risk from biomass production is incurred by the farmer. With the standard marketing 
contract (STANDARD), a portion of the price risk on expected production is shifted from the 
producer to the processor. All of the price risk is shifted from the farmer to the processor with an 
acreage contract (ACREAGE) that pays a specified price for all production produced on the 
contracted acreage. However, the ACREAGE contract does not provide any protection against 
yield risk and production cost risk. On the other hand, the gross revenue contract (REVENUE) 
provides the greatest potential risk benefits to the farmer because all of the biomass price and 






10 provides a financial incentive to reduce production cost risk by covering the materials cost of 
establishing the switch grass stand was also modeled. 
The important findings from this research were as follows. First, under the spot market 
price contract scenario, the net revenues from biomass crops were not high enough induce 
biomass production on the representative farm  Results indicate that a  price above the energy 
equivalent price would be needed to encourage biomass production on the representative farm. 
Biomass prices under the SPOT contract scenario averaged $29.44/dt (standard deviation of 
$9.34/dt) for wheat straw, $29.44/dt (standard deviation of $15.50/dt) for corn stover, and 
$34.77/dt (standard deviation of $7.43/dt) for switchgrass.  
Second, the ACREAGE and REVENUE contracts were more effective at inducing 
maximum farm biomass production at lower contract prices than the STANDARD contract for a 
risk neutral decision maker. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the same amount of biomass 
was supplied by the representative farm under the REVENUE contract as under the ACREAGE 
contract. Expected biomass crop net revenues were identical for both contract structures. Most of 
the biomass supplied by the representative farm under the STANDARD, ACREAGE, and 
REVENUE contracts was from switchgrass. In addition, some corn stover was produced but no 
wheat straw was supplied for ethanol production by the representative farm.  
Third, because the REVENUE contract reduced biomass crop net revenue variability 
relative to the ACREAGE contract, the REVENUE contract provided more risk benefits to the 
representative farm under the assumption of risk aversion. In addition, because of the greater 
price and yield protection offered with the REVENUE contract, swtichgrass production was 
generally induced at lower contract prices than with the STANDARD contract. Fourth, results of 






11 may be effective at inducing biomass larger production at lower contract prices. The incentive 
may provide a method for the processor to reduce average per ton cost of material at the plant 
gate for perennial biomass crops such as switchgrass. 
Finally, as more of the farm crop area was planted into biomass crop at higher contract 
prices, the greater the annual variation in biomass supplied to the processing plant. Thus, for a 
processor, there may be a relationship between the annual variation in biomass material supplied 
and the cost of biomass materials. A higher contract price may induce more production on an 
individual farm. This could result in fewer farms in a more concentrated geographic area being 
needed to supply the plant. The biomass materials transportation cost may be lower but the 
biomass storage cost incurred to ensure a steady supply of feedstock to the plant may be higher 
with the increased variability of annual biomass production with higher contract prices. 
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 Table 1. Risk Efficient Net Revenues, Crop Area, and Labor Usage without Biomass Crop 
Enterprises (Base Scenario)    
  Risk Significance Level (Percent) 
Item 50  60  70  80  90 
Whole-Farm Net Revenue  ---------------------------------$---------------------------------- 
     Mean  472,175   472,175    472,175   472,175  472,440 
     Standard Deviation  152,926 152,926  152,926  152,926  141,091 
     Certainty Equivalent  472,175 437,096  390,323  343,550  277,878 
Collins Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  528  528  528  528  528 
Memphis Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  100  100  100  100  274 
     Soybean  0  0  0  0  134 
     Wheat grain & straw  420  420  420  420  112 
     Soybean-wheat grain & straw  152  152  152  152  152 
Loring Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,200  913 
     Wheat grain & straw  0  0  0  0  287 
Labor Use  ------------------------------Hours------------------------------ 
     Jan-Feb  13  13  13  13  13 
     Mar-Apr  50  50  50  50  74 
     May Jun  1,375  1,375  1,375  1,375  1,344 
     Jul-Aug  2  2  2  2  2 
     Sep-Oct  679  679  679  679  682 
     Nov-Dec  80  80  80  80  77 
       Total  2,199  2,199  2,199  2,199  2,192 
Hired Labor  ------------------------------Hours------------------------------ 
     May-June  778  778  778  778  743 
     Sep-Oct  105  105  105  105  107 






14 Table 2. Risk Efficient Net Revenues, Crop Area, and Labor Usage Assuming Spot Market 
Biomass Contract Pricing with the User Facility    
  Risk Significance Level (Percent) 
Item 50  60  70  80  90 
Whole-Farm Net Revenue  ---------------------------------$---------------------------------- 
    Mean  472,175  472,175  472,175  472,175  449,666 
    Standard Deviation  152,926  152,926  152,926  152,926  139,154 
    Certaint Equivelant  472,175  437,096  390,323  343,550  277,987 
Collins Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  528  528  528  528  492 
     Switchgrass  0  0  0  0  36 
Memphis Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  100  100  100  100  282 
     Soybean  0  0  0  0  125 
     Wheat grain & straw  420  420  420  420  113 
     Soybean-wheat grain & straw  152  152  152  152  152 
Loring Soils Crops  ------------------------------Acres------------------------------ 
     Corn  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,200  917 
     Wheat grain & straw  0  0  0  0  283 
Labor Use  ------------------------------Hours------------------------------ 
     Jan-Feb  13  13  13  13  13 
     Mar-Apr  50  50  50  50  72 
     May Jun  1,375  1,375  1,375  1,375  1,340 
     Jul-Aug  2  2  2  2  2 
     Sep-Oct  679  679  679  679  671 
     Nov-Dec  80  80  80  80  130 
        Total  2,199  2,199  2,199  2,199  2,227 
Hired Labor  ------------------------------Hours------------------------------ 
     May-June  778  778  778  778  739 
     Sep-Oct  105  105  105  105  95 








15 Risk Neutral Decision Maker--75% of Expected Yield with 
No Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--STANDARD Contract on75% of 
Expected Yield With Planting Incentive






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--Acreage Contract
No Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--Acreage Contract
With Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
 
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--Gross Revenue Contract
No Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--Gross Revenue Contract
With Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
 
 
Figure 1. Representative Farm Biomass Supplied at Different Contract Prices for 
the STANDARD, ACREAGE, and REVENUE Contract Scenarios Assuming a Risk 







16 Risk Averse (ρ= 0.000017)Decision Maker--Standard Contract on 75% 
of Expected Yield with No Planting Incentive






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk Averse (ρ = 0.000017) Decision Maker--Standard Contract 
on 75% of Expected Yield with Planting Incentive






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
 
Risk Aversion (roh = 0.000017) Decision Maker--Acreage 
Contract , No Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk (roh = 0.000017)  Decision Maker-- Acreage Contract
With Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
Risk (roh = 0.000017) Decision Maker--Gross Revenue Contract
No Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw
Risk (roh = 0.000017) Decision Maker-- Gross Revenue Contract
With Planting Incentive Contract






























Switch Grass Stover Straw  
 
 
Figure 2. Representative Farm Biomass Supplied at Different Contract Prices for 
the STANDARD, ACREAGE, and REVENUE Contract Scenarios Assuming a Risk 






17 Risk Neutral Decision Maker--STANDARD Contract with 
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Risk Neutral Decision Maker--STANDARD 
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2 Std Dev Above Mean
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Risk Neutral Decision Maker-- ACERAGE Contract
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2 Std Dev Above Mean
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Risk Neutral Decision Maker-- ACREAGE Contract
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Risk Neutral Decision Maker--REVENUE Contract
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2 Std Dev Above Mean
2 Std Dev Below
Risk Neutral Decision Maker--REVENUE Contract
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Figure 3. Representative Farm Biomass Supplied at Different Contract Prices for 
the STANDARD, ACREAGE, and REVENUE Contract Scenarios Assuming a Risk 
Neutral Decision Maker 
 
 
 
 
 
18 